Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 20
Issue 1 June 1993

Article 2

1993

Savings and loan debacle : The culmination of three decades of
conflicting regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation
Geanie W. Margavio

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Margavio, Geanie W. (1993) "Savings and loan debacle : The culmination of three decades of conflicting
regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation," Accounting Historians Journal: Vol. 20 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

s and loan debacle : The culmination of three decades of conflicting regulation, deregulation, a
The Accounting
Vol. 20, No. 1
June 1993

Historians

Journal

Geanie W. Margavio
SOUTHWEST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY

THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE:
THE CULMINATION OF THREE
DECADES OF CONFLICTING
REGULATION, DEREGULATION,
AND RE-REGULATION
Abstract: The role of the public accounting profession in the savings
and loan debacle of the 1980s has recently been the subject of Congressional inquiry and extensive litigation by government agencies,
and by angry stockholders and bondholders. These efforts suggest a
broad misunderstanding by the public of the causes of the disaster.
this paper illustrates that the difficulties which precipitated the crisis
were a result of the historical development of the regulatory environment of the savings and loan industry. Examining this regulatory
environment helps in understanding the current problems and crises
of savings and loans as well as the situation in which the accounting
profession now finds itself.
The paper illustrates that the manner in which the industry was
regulated, including piecemeal and often conflicting legislation,
locked the industry into long-term mortgage commitments and then
urged diversification from these commitments. The paper illustrates
that, over the years, industry responses to this legislation created a
net worth crisis. The extent of the crisis was obscured by accounting
principles developed by regulators, and which ran contrary to GAAP.
Finally, the paper discusses recent legislation designed to correct the
regulatory and accounting inconsistencies, and the anticipated effect
of this legislation on the future of the savings and loan industry.

The end of the 1980s decade was marred by the financial
collapse of many savings and loan institutions. Current estimates of federal expenditures necessary to bail out the savings
and loan industry from its financial debacle generally exceed
$100 billion and some estimates range as high as $300 billion
[Adams, 1990, p. 17; Pilzer, 1989, p. 233]. When interest costs
on 30 to 40 year debt used to finance the federal bailout are
included, cost estimates rise steeply to between $500 billion and
$1 trillion [Carlton, 1992]. The "true" cost of the bailout will not
be known for years to come, until all of the failing institutions
have been shut down, merged, and sold off; until the Resolution
Published by eGrove, 1993
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Trust Corporation liquidates its holdings; and until all of the tax
breaks and special portfolio performance guarantees granted to
acquiring institutions have expired. Meanwhile, the American
public is still asking: how the fiasco came about; who should be
blamed for it; and how the clean up should be financed.
These are questions of particular concern for accountants
for the following reason. While the responsibility for the widespread failure in the industry has not yet been fully determined,
the role of the public accounting profession as well as the accounting standards, principles, procedures, and rules for savings and loan financial reporting have been called into question.
Auditors of failed savings and loans have been shouldering part
of the blame for the fiasco and some of the financial responsibility for the clean up, as a result of various lawsuits by federal
agencies.1 In addition, auditors have been subjected to various
class action lawsuits brought by investors in failed savings and
loans.2 These lawsuits, whether justified or not, reflect a myopic
perspective of how the debacle occurred. The thrift debacle was
not simply the result of audit irregularities, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board forbearance in closing troubled institutions, or
fraud and mismanagement by thrift industry executives. Although each of these factors contributed substantially to the
crisis, the problem was also fundamentally rooted in the historical regulation of the industry.
This paper discusses, from a historical perspective, the
regulatory environment of the savings and loan industry. Examining this regulatory history helps in understanding the current
1
By April 1986, 38 investigations had been launched by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and $3,319,000 had been turned over to the FDIC
by various auditors [U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986]. The Resolution
Trust Corporation (the agency designated to dispose of the assets of failed savings and loans) has recently filed suits against the following CPA firms for their
roles in failed savings institutions: KPMG Peat Marwick, $154 million; Deloitte
and Touche, $444 million; Pannell Kerr Forster, $41 million [Pickering, 1992].
Ernst and Young agreed to a total comprehensive settlement of $400 million.
This agreement was reached with the federal thrift regulations to resolve all
"current and potential claims" against the firm for its role in audits of failed
depository institutions [Eldridge, 1992].
2
Recently Ernst and Young agreed to pay a total of $63 million to settle a
class action lawsuit related to failed Lincoln Savings and Loan [Stevens, 1992, p.
A3]. In addition to this settlement, Ernst and Young agreed to pay the Resolution Trust Corporation $41 million [Public Accounting Report, 1992]. Arthur
Andersen has also paid a total of $30 million to bondholders of Lincoln Savings
a n d Loan [Public Accounting Report, 1992].
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problems and crises of savings and loans as well as the situation
in which the accounting profession now finds itself. The paper
illustrates how changes in regulations and conflicting regulatory
intentions laid the framework for the savings and loan debacle.
Finally, this paper calls for greater coordination of Congressional goals for savings and loans, and the financial services
industry, as the only way to achieve a lasting resolution to thrift
industry problems. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: The Early Years; Post Depression Years Through the
1960s; The 1970s: Disintermediation and Consumerism; The
1980s: Deregulation, Expansion, Crisis, Re-regulation; and What
will the 1990s Bring?
THE EARLY YEARS
The first savings and loan institution was organized in
1831. Its primary purpose was to finance home ownership for
association members. At this time, commercial banks were not
filling this need because they perceived their role as financing
the capitalization of industry [Ewalt, 1962, p. 372]. With the
growing industrialization of the nation and the need for housing
for urban residents, savings and loans spread across the country
to serve savers and home mortgage borrowers. The spread of
the thrift industry spurred a tremendous growth in residential
construction across the nation. This construction boom became
a leading factor in the prosperity of the 1920s [Keith, 1973].
Throughout this developmental period from 1831 into the
1920s, the institutions were chartered by states and were regulated by laws which varied greatly between states. Many states
had no requirement for the establishment of reserves against
losses on loans; consequently, some institutions paid out essentially all profits in dividends to shareholders. In addition, mortgage repayment arrangements frequently failed to provide for
methodical reduction of the principal balance of loans. Mortgage financing arrangements too frequently involved first, second, and third mortgages financed over periods of 10 to 15
years. This was not a great problem while real estate prices were
stabilized or rising with the economic boom in the stock market. However, in 1929, the stock market crashed and real estate
prices plummeted.
Early in the 1930s, institutions found themselves with delinquent loans, foreclosures, and a bulk of repossessed real estate
assets. With so much repossessed property for sale, even at rePublished by eGrove, 1993
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duced prices, little property was changing hands because of a
lack of public confidence in the real estate market and the banking industry. Furthermore, with assets that were illiquid and
having paid out most of the profits in prior years as dividends,
the savings and loans were in deep financial difficulty. As part
of legislation to restore financial vitality and public confidence
in the banking system, Congress enacted several laws aimed at
promoting stability in the housing market and the savings and
loan industry. Among these laws were the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act (1932), the Home Owner's Loan Act (1933), and the
National Housing Act (1934). Some of the major provisions of
these laws were as follows.
First, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act established the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System operated by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The intent of the Act was to
help hard pressed homeowners who could not get mortgage
funding from banks to receive financing from a FHLB member.
Thus, the purpose of the Board and the system was primarily to
advance funds to Federal savings and loans so that they could
advance the funds to homeowners. Secondarily, the Board regulated those institutions participating in the funds advancement.
This latter purpose was largely implemented in two ways. First,
the Board took an active role in evaluating proposed laws to
determine their effect on the financial well-being of the industry, and then lobbied Congress on the thrifts' behalf. Second,
the Board assured "that regulated institutions adhered to written laws and regulations" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 109]. This
function was a very legalistic one, which did not necessarily
coincide with determining the financial soundness of individual
institutions. While these provisions of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act served to stabilize the mortgage market by making
funds available on a regular basis, emergency funding was made
available by the Home Owners Loan Act.
The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 provided emergency
mortgage funding to distressed home-owners by offering them
long-term mortgage loans (15 year periods), with fixed interest
rates capped at 5% initially. This Act further provided that Federal savings and loans could only lend their funds for home
mortgages and combinations of home and business property
mortgages; and these loans could only be made within 50 miles
of the association's home office. Finally, the Act specifically exempted Federal savings and loans from federal taxation and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/2
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from taxation by any state. This offered the institutions tax protection for the purpose of rebuilding their reserves.
The third major act, The National Housing Act, established
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to
insure depositors at the savings associations. It also established
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure savings associations against losses on mortgages and home improvement
loans and to regulate amortization of those loans. Additionally,
the Act established the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA or Fannie Mae) to create a secondary market for mortgages. 3 Finally, the Act provided that each institution establish a
reserve of 5% of deposits. Institutions were given 10 years to
meet this goal. These three laws marked the first Federal involvement in the housing industry, and reflect the national recognition of the important role of savings and loans in home
ownership. This depression-era legislation set the framework for
the system of federally chartered savings and loans.
THE POST-DEPRESSION YEARS THROUGH THE 1960s
Under this regulatory framework, the savings and loan industry returned to prosperity in the late 1930s. From then until
the late 1960s, the institutions experienced increasing profit
margins. This prosperity was the result of several factors including the following. First, World War II promoted high long-term
mortgage rates and low short-term interest payments to depositors, with rates r e m a i n i n g relatively stable t h r o u g h o u t the
1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. Second, a tremendous post-war
prosperity was experienced across the nation. Third, the middle
class enlarged, a n d society began moving to the s u b u r b s .
Fourth, real estate prices escalated; and, fifth, the Federal government established a continuing concern for housing developm e n t [Ewalt, 1962, pp. 255-341]. This Federal concern for housing fueled savings and loan prosperity during the Post-Depression years; however, it also established the framework for the
difficulties the industry would encounter in the 1970s, and ultimately the 1980s, for the reasons detailed below.

3
Provisions of these Acts are summarized in U.S. Congress, Evolution of
[the] Role of the Federal Government in Housing and Community Development,
1975.
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Increasing Role of Federal Government in Setting Mortgage Terms
During the post-depression years, the availability of the secondary mortgage market (through Fannie Mae) enabled institutions with excess cash to participate in the prosperous mortgage
lending in booming housing markets. However, in order for institutions to sell mortgages through Fannie Mae, the mortgages
had to meet FHA criteria. These criteria related most notably to
the length of the loan repayment period, the percentage of appraised value eligible for loan financing (referred to as loan-tovalue ratios), and interest rate caps on the loans. Initial repayment periods were 15 to 20 years, with loan-to-value ratios of
80%. These values were changed almost annually through the
1940s and 1950s in various Housing Acts. One of these Acts, the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill of Rights),
established a program of government regulated, government insured loans especially for veterans. Provisions of these loans
were similar to FHA loan provisions. The loans were administered by the Veterans Administration (VA) and eventually became known as VA loans.
The VA and FHA loan terms at times had repayment periods extended to 40 years, and at times loan to value ratios were
as high as 97% [Mason, 1982, p. 64], The government rationale
for supporting such generous mortgage terms continued to be
that "housing is a segment of the economy demanding special
treatment to assure a flow of credit which it would not ordinarily attract" [Ewalt, 1962, p. 262]. This government philosophy was effective in attracting capital to the mortgage market,
primarily in the form of a growth in mortgage bankers. The
mortgage bankers aggressively marketed FHA and VA insured
loans with long maturities and low interest rates. They then sold
these loans to Fannie Mae. This fierce competition from the
mortgage bankers forced the savings and loans to make FHA
and VA qualified loans, or, alternatively, to make conventional
loans which closely paralleled the long repayment periods, low
interest rates and generous loan to value ratios of the FHA
loans. Thus, the FHA loan terms became the industry standard,
and savings and loans began to lock themselves into 20, 30, and
40 year loan commitments.
Fuelled by generous FHA and VA loan terms, and FSLIC
insurance guarantees, housing starts in the 1950s and 1960s
reached record levels; and the savings and loan industry continued to prosper. This prosperity led to the creation of new savhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/2
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ings and loan institutions, and these associations were given up
to 20 years to meet the 5% reserve requirement established in
the National Housing Act. During this period of increasing prosperity for savings and loans, the institutions found their assets
expanding in geometric proportions. At the same time, commercial banks were experiencing only modest growth [Woerheide,
1984, p. 5]. The commercial banking industry attributed the
savings and loan prosperity to favorable tax treatment because,
during the World War II and Post-War Era, savings and loan
associations were not subject to federal income taxation. The
tax policy at that time (consistent with the regulatory policy)
was that these institutions served a vital role in financing the
development of residential housing, an important national goal
[Biederman and Tuccillo, 1976, p. 5]. In addition, since savings
and loans were traditionally mutually owned, they were viewed
as tax conduits for the depositors/owners. This preferential tax
treatment, not available to commercial banks, was a continual
irritant to the commercial banking industry which voiced complaints about this unfair tax treatment afforded savings and
loans.
The Revenue Act of 1951
Commercial banking arguments centered around the fact
that savings and loans were in direct competition with commercial banks for savings deposits; and that if savings and loans
were to be allowed to compete with banks for deposits, they
should be subject to equal taxation [U.S. Congress, 1951, p.
783]. In response to these and other persuasive arguments advanced by commercial banks, the Revenue Act of 1951 amended
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to treat savings and loans as
regular corporations. 4 This Act set the framework for savings
and loan taxation. It was significant because it signalled a shift
in tax policy which lost some of its focus on protecting saving
and loans because of their commitment to housing finance, and
4
Several exceptions to this general rule of taxing savings and loans as regular corporations have developed over the years. Major exceptions include: the
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction (discussed at length in the text
of this paper), ordinary loss treatment from the sale of corporate and government securities, deduction for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt bonds (preTax Reform Act of 1986) and a longer net operating loss carryback period (preTax Reform Act of 1986). These exceptions, as well as several less significant
ones, are explained more fully by Halperin [1971] and by Clark [1975].
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moved towards the concept of tax equality among thrifts and
banks competing for consumer deposits. This shift marked a
divergence in tax policy and FHLBB regulatory policy. Although
the tax policy shift at this time was major, the actual tax impact
was negligible for the following reason.
The Revenue Act of 1951, in addition to subjecting savings
and loans to taxation for the first time, provided them a choice
of methods for determining their allowance for bad debts. This
allowance then determined the bad debt deduction for tax purposes. Like other corporations, savings and loans could choose
to set up their allowance based on actual bad debt experience,
averaged over a specified period of years. In lieu of this experience method, they could choose the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction.5 This method enabled the institutions
to write off as much as 100% of their taxable income to a reserve for bad debts. The balance of this reserve, together with
earned surplus and undivided profits, was limited to 12% of
total deposits. This limitation was, as a practical matter, seldom
a binding constraint [U.S. Congress, 1969, p. 3514]. Thus, while
savings and loans were nominally taxable entities, few paid any
income tax until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1962.
The Revenue Act of 1962
In 1962, Congress again devoted its attention to the issue of
savings and loan taxation. This reconsideration was initiated by
President Kennedy's demand for a review of the taxes of "private savings and lending institutions [that] are accorded tax deductible reserve provisions which substantially reduce or eliminate their Federal income tax liability" [U.S. Congress, 1961, p.
2]. As a result of the ensuing Congressional review, the Revenue
Act of 1962 reduced the percentage of taxable income bad debt
deduction rate to 60% of taxable income. Subsequent to this
change, effective tax rates of savings and loans rose (see Exhibit
5
Savings and loans could also choose a method known as the "3-percent
method" which allowed them to set up a reserve at three percent of eligible
loans (as defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939). This method became
known in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) as the percentage of eligible
loans method. This method underwent few changes from 1954 to 1986 when it
was struck from the law in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. For this reason, and
since most of the controversy over bad debt deductions for savings and loans
focused on the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction, this method is
not discussed further in this paper.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/2
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1). The Act also added a restriction that savings and loans using
this deduction were required to hold at least 72% of their assets
in "qualified assets." Qualified assets included residential real
property loans; loans secured by members' deposits or by
church facilities; cash and U.S. government obligations; and
property used in conduct of the institution's business [Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) section 7701(a)(19)(C)]. This was the first
explicit linking in the tax law between the percentage of taxable
income bad debt deduction and an institution's investment in
mortgages. It also placed the tax law in the position of dictating
specific investments allowable for savings and loans. This introduced a conflict in allowable investments for tax and regulatory
purposes.
At this time, savings and loans had little choice but to accept their tax increase because the regulatory rules which specified permitted savings and loan investments were even more
stringent than the 72% investment in qualified assets required
for tax purposes.6 While the tax law did not specify how the
remaining 28% of assets had to be invested, regulatory rules
limited investments exclusively to: (1) residential mortgage
loans on one to four-family home types, (2) loans secured by
members' deposits, (3) cash, (4) government securities, (5) property used in conduct of the institution's business, (6) residential
property improvement loans (limited to 15% of total assets), or
(7) loans on the security of improved real estate other than one
to four-family home types (limited to 20% of total assets) [12
CFR 545.11]. Thus, for all practical purposes, regulatory investments, other than cash, government bonds, business property,
and loans secured by members' deposits, were committed to
residential mortgages and improvements to residential property.
Effectively only 20% of an institution's assets could be invested
in anything other than residential property and related loans.
Because of these constraints, savings and loans had to maintain
approximately 80% of their assets invested in qualified assets to
meet regulatory requirements.

6

Savings and loans could have expanded their investment in tax free government bonds in order to avoid incurring a greater tax burden. Baer [1983] illustrates the potential benefits of this strategy. Hendershott and Koch [1980], however, present contradictory evidence showing that relative before tax returns on
taxable and non-taxable investments would have to be in excess of their historic
relationship to make this strategy worthwhile.
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EXHIBIT 1
Aggregate Effective Tax Rates of
Savings and Loan Associations, 1960-1988
(Dollars in Millions)a

Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Net Income
Before Taxes
$

552

716
820
764
919
929
727
711
1,011
1,230
1,166
1,748
2,317
2,655
2,144
2,082
3,219
4,610
5,717
5,198
1,193
-6,148
-5,869
2,561
1,871
5,951
3,300
-4,100
-11,565

Taxes

$

4
3
3
93
131
134
97
95
148
194
241
434
630
758
661
634
969

Effective
Tax Rate
0.7%

0.4
0.4

409

12.2
14.3
14.4
13.3
13.2
14.7
15.8
20.7
24.8
27.2
28.5
30.8
30.5
30.1
30.6
31.5
30.4
34.3

-1,516
-1,598

N/A
N/A

593
770

23.2
41.2
35.5
N/Ab
N/Ab
N/Ab

1,412
1,799
1,578

2,112
3,100
2,700
1,874

a

Information obtained from U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p. 50]
and U.S. Congress [1983, p. 286].
b
Industry-wide effective tax rates for these years are meaningless because they
reflect a growing disparity in income between profitable and unprofitable institutions.

Such an investment level was not a hardship for the institutions during this time period because, as discussed previously,
profit margins were relatively stable, demand was relatively
stable, and real estate prices were rising. This was the last time
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/2
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the industry experienced such stability. In the years following
1961, further conflicts developed between allowable assets for
tax and regulatory purposes, thereby sending the industry a
mixed message on the role it was expected to play in home
financing. Tax burdens on the industry increased; and Regulation Q was imposed by regulators. The regulatory rationale for
the implementation of Regulation Q is explained in the following section.
Regulation Q Imposed
Beginning in the mid-1960s, inflation became a serious
problem. Fuelled by the Vietnam War, which the government
tried to finance without a major tax increase, inflation rates
became higher and more variable than in the past [Carron,
1982, p. 5]. The rampant inflation exerted upward pressure on
market interest rates, which were also being driven upwards by
competition among savings and loans in the western and eastern portions of the country, and between banks and savings and
loans.
By 1966, interest rates reached a 100 year high [Bowden
and Holbert, 1984, p. 28]. The Federal government became concerned about savings and loans' ability to pay these high interest
rates to depositors. Since their portfolios were tied up in longterm, fixed-rate residential mortgages, savings and loans were
unable to make rapid adjustments in their revenue base to offset
the rising cost of short-term borrowing (deposits). Thus, the
industry was trapped by fixed-yield, long-term investments financed by short-term borrowing at volatile interest rates. To
protect the savings and loan industry, in 1966 the Federal government imposed Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings on savings
and loans. This was viewed as a viable means of keeping down
savings and loans' cost of funds and protecting the industry
from competitive forces. Subsequent to imposition of Regulation Q, market rates dropped and some observers believed that
savings and loans were out of trouble. This belief may have
been at least partially responsible for the imposition of additional taxes on savings and loans in the Revenue Act of 1969.
The Revenue Act of 1969
The Revenue Act of 1969 increased savings and loan taxes
by reducing the percentage of taxable income limit for the bad
Published by eGrove, 1993
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debt deduction. During the hearings which preceded this act,
the savings and loan industry requested that the definition of
qualified assets be expanded to encompass new regulatory powers. 7 Regulators had expanded savings and loan allowable assets
to include certain education loans (up to five percent of total
assets), housing for the aging (up to five percent of total assets),
loans on improved real estate other than residential property,
and loans for the acquisition and development of land (raised
from 15% to 20% of total assets) [12 CFR 545.6-545.8]. However, the industry was unable to pursue these investments because of the stringent asset restrictions of Section 7701(a)(19) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the tax law and operating regulations were in conflict.
As a partial response to industry pleas, the 1969 Act expanded qualified assets to include: loans secured by commercial
property in certain u r b a n renewal areas; loans secured by
school, health, or welfare facilities; and student loans. However,
the qualified assets percentage was increased to 82%, and a
sliding scale implemented for investment levels from 82% to
60%. For every one percent of an institution's portfolio which
fell below 82%, the bad debt deduction was reduced by threefourths of one percent. Once the institution's portfolio fell to
less t h a n 60% investment in qualified assets, it could no longer
use the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction.
This marked the widest divergence yet in tax and regulatory
policy. While regulators were becoming more lenient in allowing institutions some limited diversification out of residential
mortgages (up to 30% of the portfolio), the tax law was imposing a tax penalty for diversification in excess of 18%. In addition
to this constraint, the Act reduced the deduction rate from 60%
to 40%, phased in over a 10 year period. Thus, even those institutions not diversifying experienced a tax increase. 8 This tax
increase contributed to a severe financial crunch which gripped
the industry in the 1970s.

7
See testimony of William J. Hallahan, Consultant on Monetary Policy and
Economic Affairs, National League of Insured Savings Associations [U.S. Congress, 1969, p. 3524].
8
See Exhibit 1 for a summary of Savings and Loans effective tax rates following the 1969 Act.
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THE 1970s: DISINTERMEDIATION, CONSUMERISM AND
NET WORTH CRISIS
During the 1970s, a growing rate of inflation was experienced across the country. This was attributed in part to the
Federal government trying to finance the Vietnam War without
any major tax increase, and to the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 100% increase in oil prices. In an
effort to curb the growing inflation problem, the Federal Reserve Bank increased its discount rate and its reserve requirements to record levels. It also implemented a new monetary
control policy which focused on regulation of the total reserves
of the banking system instead of regulation of short-term interest rates. Subsequent to announcement of this policy, shortterm market interest rates rose rapidly. This precipitated financial chaos in the savings and loan industry.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, savings and loans were
prevented by Regulation Q from passing these high short-term
market interest rates on to their depositors. This situation motivated depositors to withdraw funds from savings and loans in
order to invest in alternative, higher yielding investment vehicles (particularly money market mutual funds) offered by unregulated intermediaries. This disintermediation forced savings
and loans to enter the market as short-term borrowers, paying
very high interest rates on borrowed funds. Meanwhile, their
income-generating portfolios were tied up in long-term, low interest bearing, fixed-rate mortgages. This latter problem was
largely the result of years of savings and loan responses to the
trend in mortgage lending established by the FHA and VA, and
the portfolio restrictions established by Congress.
The institutions fought back against these regulations by
circumventing them to the extent possible. Since investment opportunities were still largely limited to mortgages by FHLBB
regulations, and by tax regulation, the savings and loans began
to enhance their services. The industry expanded operations
into costly branch networks (Exhibit 2) and other customer
amenities, thus causing operating costs to rise. Savings and
loans expected that these enhanced services would lure back
customer deposits. To further lure depositors, they began offering Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal (NOW accounts) which
were in substance interest-bearing checking accounts. This
strategy further increased operating costs and resulted in a severe profit squeeze for the industry.
Published by eGrove, 1993
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EXHIBIT 2
Number of Savings Institutions and Their Branch Offices,
1960-1987a
Savings Institutions Offices

a

Year-end

Main

Branch

Total

1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

6,320
6,185
5,669
5,474
5,298
5,170
5,086
4,931
4,821
4,761
4,725
4,684
4,594
4,298
3,831
3,645
3,591
3,535
3,488
3,408

1,611
2,994
4,318
4,961
5,851
7,036
8,775
10,518
11,908
13,087
14,250
15,508
16,733
17,495
18,712
18,635
18,812
19,186
19,540
19,664

7,931
9,179
9,987
10,435
11,149
12,206
13,861
15,449
16,729
17,848
18,975
20,192
21,327
21,793
22,543
22,280
22,403
22,721
23,028
23,072

Source: U.S. League of Savings Institutions [1989, p. 56].

This profit squeeze was the beginning of the savings and
loan debacle of the 1980s. As profits plunged, the net worth, or
capital position, of the industry eroded making reserve requirements ever more difficult to maintain. This situation prompted
the industry to pressure the Bank Board into extending its deadline to meet the 5% reserve requirements. In 1972, the Board
responded by authorizing institutions to compute their reserves
as a percentage of savings deposits averaged over a five-year
period. As the earnings positions of the institutions continued to
weaken, the industry trade organization, the U.S. League of Savings Institutions, petitioned Congress to reduce the reserve requirements. Congress eventually did this in the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980.
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THE 1980s: DEREGULATION, EXPANSION,
CRISIS, RE-REGULATION
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 was the first in a series of ill
conceived regulation attempting to repair the regulatory induced damage done to the savings and loan industry in the
1970s. The regulation of the 1980s was ill conceived for several
reasons. First, deregulation of savings and loan liabilities (freeing interest rates on interest bearing deposits) preceded deregulation of investments, thus exacerbating an already volatile
earnings situation. Secondly, regulators authorized the use of
several accounting methods which obscured the true financial
condition of the industry. Finally, a lack of communication and
coordination among various government regulators created a
regulatory environment of uncertainty and confusion about the
role the institutions were to play as financial intermediaries.
Details of how this confusion developed follows in the discussion of the regulatory events that occurred during the 1980s.
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain Act
The first of the regulatory changes in the 1980s, DIDMCA,
authorized a phase out of Regulation Q deposit rate ceilings,
thus allowing savings and loans to increase rates paid on deposits (liabilities). In addition, the law legitimized NOW accounts
nationwide. Both of these provisions caused an increase in the
institutions' cost of funds. Furthermore, the Act gave the Federal Home Loan Bank Board the authority to vary reserves (or
capital) requirements for individual institutions between 3 %
and 6% of deposits. The Act also granted savings and loans
some limited freedom to diversify asset holdings including the
ability to invest up to 3 % of assets in service corporations (i.e.,
subsidiary corporations allowed to participate in a wide range
of business activities). These asset diversification powers were
further expanded in 1982.
The 1982 Act, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act, allowed savings and loans to invest up to 30% of their assets in consumer loans and corporate debt, up to 40% in nonresidential real estate, and up to 10% in commercial loans. In
addition to these new investment powers, the Garn-St. Germain
Act eliminated loan to value ratios on all loans (thus permitting
100% financing of real estate projects); and, for the first time,
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permitted adjustable rate mortgages. Regulators believed that,
collectively, these 1980 and 1982 changes would enable savings
and loans to diversify some of their long-term lending and
short-term borrowing financial structure and better weather
changing economic conditions in the future.
This expectation may have proved true had the DIDMCA
and Garn-St. Germain asset reforms been enacted a decade earlier, before the devastating interest rate spread losses in the
1970s. As it happened, upon entering the 1980s, savings and
loan profits were at a historical low (Exhibit 1), and institutions
may have lacked the capital to acquire investment expertise in
many of the areas newly opened to them. Furthermore, reserves
for some institutions were below the 3% minimum mandated by
Congress in DIDMCA [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 31]. Garn-St.
Germain provided a solution to problem in the form of net
worth certificates.
Beginning in September, 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Act
allowed a pseudo-capital infusion for under capitalized institutions in the form of net worth certificates which the institutions
purchased from the FSLIC. These certificates served to increase
an institution's assets and equity for regulatory purposes, and
basically provided for a semi-annual cash infusion to the institution by the FSLIC until such time as the institution returned
to profitability.9 These net worth certificates were not treated as
capital by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).10
This became the first in a series of GAAP versus RAP (regulatory
accounting principles) differences which obfuscated analysis of
the financial condition of savings and loans. Other such differences were deferral of loan losses and appraised equity capital,
discussed below.

9

Net worth certificates were recorded as Notes Receivable-FSLIC and Capital. Under the arrangement the FSLIC paid interest on these notes semiannually
to the institution "at rates equal to the yield on FHLBB obligations plus 25 basis
points" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3]. The institution would
then reimburse the FSLIC at the same rate of interest, "but interest is not due
until the institution returns to profitability" [Peat Marwick Main & Co., 1988,
Section 19.3.2].
10
Per GAAP, the net worth certificates were treated as an off balance sheet
item which was to be disclosed in footnotes, although interest accruals were
made [Peat, Marwick, Main and Co., 1988, Section 19.3.3].
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GAAP versus RAP
In order to buy time for institutions to restructure their
portfolios in response to the new investment opportunities of
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the FHLBB developed a series
of optional accounting rules designed to bolster the appearance
of net worth. The most prominent of these became the appraised equity capital provisions, and deferral of losses on the
sale of loans. 11 Appraised equity capital arose from institutions
recording the increase in the market value of the office buildings which they owned and occupied. During the 1970s, some
institutions began to build net worth by selling their buildings,
recording the gain, and leasing the facility back from the new
owners. From November, 1982, to December, 1986 the FHLBB
permitted all institutions to "book" this gain in market value,
without actually selling the premises, calling it "appraised equity capital." This non-consummated transaction was not recognized by GAAP.
In contrast to this GAAP violation, a second FHLBB regulation challenged GAAP by deferring recognition of transactions
that were consummated. This new provision allowed the deferral of losses on the sale of loans. By contrast, GAAP required
recognition of these losses. However, in order to encourage institutions to sell off low interest bearing loans, the Bank Board
allowed any such losses to be deferred and amortized over what
remained of the original life of the loan. This regulation was in
effect from October, 1981 to October, 1984. These two primary
regulatory accounting techniques constituted the most blatant
departures from GAAP; however, other differences also developed.
Other GAAP versus RAP differences developed because of
aggressive interpretation of existing GAAP rules, special institution specific decisions made by the Bank Board, and a delay in
the issuance of authoritative accounting literature by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Some of these included the following. First, RAP allowed recognition of gains
and losses on "wash sales" of securities sold and reacquired
within a short period of time, while GAAP did not allow such
recognition. Second, RAP allowed recognition of current income from loan origination and commitment fees up to 2% of
11

Several less significant differences in GAAP and RAP which existed at this
time are summarized in McEachern, 1986.
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loan value, while GAAP required recognition of these fees as an
adjustment to yield over the life of the loan using the interest
method of amortization.12 Third, RAP allowed use of real estate
appraisals to satisfy GAAP requirements of net present value
computations for valuation of real estate collateral on acquisition, development and construction loans. Fourth, for certain
mergers of troubled institutions, the FHLBB allowed goodwill
to be amortized over an extended period of time, while GAAP
allowed such extensions only when a substantial amount of liabilities acquired were long-term in nature. In addition, for certain mergers including FSLIC cash assistance, RAP treated this
as a contribution to capital, while GAAP generally treated this
as a deferred revenue or discount on the assets for which the
allowance was granted.13
Many of these GAAP verses RAP discrepancies were vehemently opposed by the accounting profession because of the
potential for creating misleading financial statements. Several
comment letters to this effect were written by the AICPA and
the FASB to the FHLBB, the Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, the
SEC, and various individual Congressmen.14 Some of the comment letters were written as early as January, 1981 when the
RAP rules were only at the proposal stage. Each letter detailed
differences between the RAP treatment and the GAAP treatment
(or proposed GAAP treatment), indicating the potential for distortion of an institution's capital position. The profession feared
such distortions would then mask the true financial condition of
the savings and loan industry.
These concerns from the accounting profession went largely
unheeded, as evidenced by regulators' decision to allow RAP for
reporting purposes. Furthermore, regulators allowed each institution to choose which set of accounting rules, GAAP or RAP, to
follow in preparing its financial statements to be filed with the
Bank Board. Not surprisingly, those institutions adopting RAP
12
This GAAP treatment was not promulgated until issuance of Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 19, Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and
Costs associated with Originating or Acquiring Loans and Initial Direct Costs of
Leases, in December, 1986.
13
Details of these four GAAP verses RAP differences are described in
McEachern [1986, p. S-48, S-49] and Peat Marwick Main and Co. [1988, Chapter 30.2 and 21].
14
An extensive list of these communications is presented in Chenok, 1989,
pp. 150 and 154.
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were generally found to be the ones with lower capital ratios
[Hill and Ingram, 1989]. Since institutions with low capital ratios were in danger of violating minimum net worth requirements, they could have been forced to merge or liquidate. For
such institutions, the adoption of RAP served to postpone intervention by the FHLBB. This forbearance by the FHLBB has
been cited as one of the factors contributing to the savings and
loan debacle of the 1980s. 15
Forbearance by the FHLBB should not, however, have been
surprising, since the Board had behaved similarly in the crisis
of the 1970s (as discussed previously) by manipulating capital
standards. In doing this, the Board was conforming to its original legislative purpose established in the 1930s: to assure the
uninterrupted flow of funds to the savings and loan industry.
This original legislative intention assumed the primary purpose
of savings and loans to be the supply of funds for residential
mortgages. A broadening of the scope of the industry was, however, introduced in the new investment vehicles provided by
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain legislation. The role of the
FHLBB following these changes was not updated. This was only
one of several conflicts in Congressional intent. Another conflict
was manifest in the tax law.
Tax Reforms in the 1980s
The specific tax law provisions related to savings and loans
remained virtually unchanged following DIDMCA and Garn-St.
Germain. Despite the investment flexibility permitted under
DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain, the tax law still required savings and loans to maintain between 82% and 60% of their assets
in qualified form (primarily residential mortgages). While still
demanding this large commitment to residential mortgages, and
even as industry profits sagged, tax changes made in 1982 and
1984 served to increase the tax burden placed upon the institutions. The tax changes increased the tax burden on savings and
loans by reducing the percentage of taxable income bad debt
deduction from 40% to 32% of taxable income. 16 This deduction
was further reduced to 8% in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
15

Pilzer, P., 1989; Pizzo, S., Flicker, M. and Muolo, P., 1989; and Adams, J.,
1990 each discuss this problem at length.
l6
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 added section 291,
which provided that the deduction for certain preference items, including the
bad debt reserves of savings and loans (to the extent they exceeded reserves
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made two major changes to
the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction. First, the
Act eliminated the sliding scale between 82% and 60% investm e n t in qualified assets. This effectively reduced the minimum
required investment to 60%. This change brought tax qualified
assets into closer alignment with regulatory allowed assets for
the first time since 1969. The second change reduced the deduction percentage from 32% to 8% of taxable income. Prior to the
passage of this provision, Congress had contemplated the complete elimination of this deduction [U.S. Congress, 1983]. Thus,
the savings and loan institutions became aware that they were
losing their tax protection for performing their service to the
mortgage market. At the same time, they were allowed more
flexibility in structuring their portfolios. The message from Congress was consistent at this point: diversify and become fully
taxable financial intermediaries. Some institutions acted quickly
to diversify.
Expansion

and Crisis

Some savings and loans began using new investment powers granted to diversify out of residential mortgages. 17 However,
by the time these powers were granted in the 1980s, the industry had a severe net worth problem. The Bank Board, anxious to
encourage an influx of new capital into the industry, dropped a
long standing requirement that institutions have a m i n i m u m of
400 shareholders, with no one shareholder owning more t h a n
25% of the savings and loan. After this policy change, institutions were eligible for 100% ownership by a single individual
[Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 94]. This attracted a new type of
owner/manager to the savings and loan business: mortgage bro-

computed under the experience method), be reduced by 15% of the otherwise
allowable deduction. At the same time, the amount considered a preference for
the minimum tax computation was reduced to 71.6% of excess reserves [IRC
section 57(b)(1) and (2)]. Assuming that the entire percentage of taxable income
bad debt deduction addition to the reserve was in excess of the experience
method, the applicable rate for the deduction was reduced to 34%. Next, the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 reduced this deduction rate to 32% by increasing
the IRC section 291 rate to 20% and also reducing the amount included in the
minimum tax base to 59.833% of the excess. This reduced the bad debt deduction to 32% of taxable income.
17
For a summary of empirical research documenting this diversification and
its effects on profits, see Margavio, 1990.
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kers and land developers who saw the opportunity to capture a
source of financing for their investments and projects. "In both
cases, an association charter now provided them [the new owners] with a lower cost and more certain source of funds than
commercial bank borrowings" [Strunk and Case, 1988, p. 95].
In addition, the borrowings were federally insured by the
FSLIC.
Federal insurance of depositor accounts by the FSLIC was
the root of a risky investment strategy undertaken by many institutions that were desperate to build their net worth. If the big
risks paid off, then the institution and its shareholders would
benefit, but if risky investments did not pay off, the FSLIC
would share in the loss of a collapse of the association. Some
institutions invested extensively in junk bonds, and others increased interest rate hedging transactions to a level of gambling
on the direction of future interest rates. 18 Institutions began investing heavily in ADC (acquisition, development, and construction) loans to fund the commercial and residential real estate
development activity of the new owner. 19
In order to attract funds to finance this activity, some institutions began offering interest rate premiums to depositors.
This attracted a substantial amount of deposits from brokers
outside of the institution's geographic area. Savings and loans
were limited to obtaining 5% of deposits from this source. However, in March 1982, the restriction was removed by the Bank
Board and billions of dollars flowed out of money market funds
and into thrifts [Strunk and Case, p. 91, 92]. Institutions using
brokered deposits began to grow at a phenomenal pace, further
fuelling real estate development activity. 20
Some thrifts became so extensively involved in funding real
estate development activities of certain developers that the institutions became, in substance, equity partners. This was particularly true in the case of ADC loans. Accounting rules during this
time allowed such loans to be classified as loans rather than
direct investments, obscuring the true relationship between the

18
Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 5, "The Gamblers," pp.
123-135; and in chapter 6, "The Man With the Lucky Coin," pp. 136-149.
19
Pilzer [1989] describes this strategy in Chapter 4, "The Cowboys," pp. 80122.
20
Many institutions were growing at rates faster than 25% per year [Pilzer,
1989, p. 174].
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institution and the developer. 21 In addition, many fraudulent appraisals were obtained to value the collateral land. In the early
1980, this problem was not discovered because real estate prices
continued to rise. This spurred another problem. Some institutions became careless in granting credit to applicants under the
assumption that if the loan went bad, increasing property values
would cover the losses. Problems with these strategies surfaced
in the Southwest beginning in late 1985 and early 1986 when a
drop in oil prices caused a major economic recession. This was
followed by a substantial decline in real estate prices; a problem
which spread nationwide with the spread of the recession. In
a d d i t i o n , by 1985 m a n y m a r k e t s b e g a n t o show signs of
overbuilding as office vacancies rose. 22 This condition was aggravated by 1986 tax changes which eliminated many tax benefits for real estate ownership. 23 Consequently, the n u m b e r of
failing institutions began to rise (Exhibit 3).
Both the FHLBB and the FSLIC were aware of the problem.
They were, however, prevented from acting quickly to close the
institutions because of a severely outdated regulatory structure
and purpose. The historical purpose of the FHLBB examiners
was to check for compliance with government regulations. This
required little training since substantial regulatory changes were
not often made. Consequently, examiner positions were filled by
low level civil service employees. Examiners merely reported
their findings to the Washington Office of the FHLBB; the examiners could not require establishment of reserves for loan
losses, and had no other enforcement powers. Enforcement
powers rested with the supervisory branch of the Federal Home

21
Subsequent to the publicizing of some of the thrift industry problems, the
Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA issued (in February,
1986) a "Notice to Practitioners - ADC arrangements." This notice clarified stringent rules which must be met for classification of ADC loans as loans. Those
arrangements not meeting the rules were required to be shown as equity investments. [Peat Mar-wick Main and Co., 1988, Chapter 6].
22
The overbuilding was largely a result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 which gave special tax breaks for investing in real estate. Investors seeking
tax deductions formed highly leveraged tax shelter partnerships which overbuilt
the real estate market. The leverage used in these real estate partnerships came
in part from the savings and loan industry.
23
These tax changes include passive investment loss limitations for investments in real estate; change in depreciation computations; at risk rules applied
to real estate investment; investment interest limitations; and capital gains
changes.
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EXHIBIT 3
Failures of FSLIC-Insured Institutions a

a

Year

Number

Assets
(In Millions of Dollars)

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

11
28
74
55
27
49
85
71

$ 1,457.6
11,553.4
20,202.9
19,741.8
6,000.4
18,441.3
31,620.5
20,918.1

Source: Strunk and Case, 1988, pp. 8, 9.

Loan Bank which consisted of the president and a small staff at
the regional FHLB level. This structure created delays in communications of problems and further delay in corrective action.
Once c o m m u n i c a t i o n difficulties were overcome and a
problem institution identified, the first step in taking action was
for the regional FHLB to obtain a "consent decree." In this
agreement, the thrift management would voluntarily discontinue specified transactions. If this failed, "cease and desist" orders and management removal requests were sought. These
could only be issued by the Washington Office. They were difficult to obtain because they could be challenged in court, and
required additional evidence of wrongdoing. Despite these
shortcomings, the system worked until the deregulation of the
1980s added complexities to the business.
With the proliferation of new investments allowed in the
1980s, rapid market changes in the late 1970s, and the expansion of branch networks, the FHLBB examination staff was
overextended and undertrained as to potential problems. Examinations of the institutions took more time and were conducted less frequently as problems mounted. Then the stories of
the famous failures surfaced. 24 The FHLBB petitioned Congress
24

The Empire Savings and Loan of Mesquite, Texas scandal become public
information in 1983 when the owners became the subjects of an extensive FBI
investigation for fraud, conspiracy and racketeering in various land flip deals
[Pilzer, 1989, p . 115]. American Savings of Stockton, California received public
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to tighten the regulatory reins to give the FHLBB power to act
more quickly in "cease and desist" cases, and to provide funds
to the FSLIC so that it could absorb projected losses from closing problem institutions.
Re-regulation
Congress responded with the Competitive Equality Banking
Act (CEBA) of 1987, the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of
1991. These Acts provided a much needed infusion of funds
(approximately $177 billion) to the FSLIC; and established the
Resolution Trust Corporation, a temporary entity, to dispose of
the assets of failed institutions. The Acts also changed the savings and loan regulatory structure by abolishing the FHLBB
system. The FHLBB supervisory and examination functions
were turned over to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 32]. Responsibilities of the OTS were
designed with greater emphasis on assessing the financial viability and asset quality of institutions. Thus, responsibilities
more closely paralleled those of the Office of Controller of the
Currency, the banking industry supervisory agency. The OTS
was also given greater autonomy in requiring operating changes
for, and ultimately, shutting down institutions judged to have
too many risky investments.
In order for the OTS to perform this function effectively,
objective measures of riskiness had to be established. A system
of risk determination was structured for both individual assets,
and for an institution's entire portfolio of assets. This system
recognizes a strong connection between the quality of an
institution's assets, individually and collectively, and how that
quality improves or deteriorates the institution's capital posiattention in 1984 when regulators forced out the CEO for betting wrong on
interest rate swings and masking bad real estate loans [Pilzer, 1989, p. 216-219].
Vernon Savings and Loan of Dallas, Texas entered receivership in 1987 when
96% of its real estate loans were deemed worthless [Adams, 1990, p. 47]. Lincoln Savings and Loan of Irvine, California became a much publicized scandal
in 1987 when news of its fraudulent real estate deals and ties to the "Keating
Five" were revealed [Adams, 1990, p. 252]. Columbia Savings and Loan of
Beverly Hills, California, and Franklin Savings Association of Ottawa, Kansas
were exposed in 1988 for their huge portfolios of junk bonds and their relationship with Michael Milken [Pilzer, 1989, p. 136-149].
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tion. Definitions of risk are, therefore, cast in terms of minim u m capital standards required to sustain the institution's investment in certain types of assets. The definitions and capital
requirements were borrowed largely from the three tier capital
standards system used by the Office of Controller of the Currency. A brief overview of the composition of these tiers is presented below.
Tier one, core capital (or leverage capital), is defined as the
sum of common stockholders' equity and noncumulative preferred stockholders' equity; plus identifiable intangibles (excluding goodwill and limited to 25% of total core capital); plus purchased mortgage servicing rights. Savings and loans must maintain this core capital at a level of 3 % of total assets. In addition,
a second tier, defined as tangible capital, must be maintained at
a level of 1.5% of total assets. Tangible capital is defined as core
capital (tier one) minus all intangible assets. Finally, tier three,
known as risk-based capital standards, requires institutions to
maintain reserves of 6% of risk-weighted assets and to increase
this percentage for interest rate fluctuations that adversely affect earnings [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 32; 12CFR Ch.V Part
567]. Each major category of assets is given a risk weighting
factor which is multiplied by the dollar amount of assets in that
category. 25 These risk factors are changed as market conditions
dictate. There is a gradual phase in period until January 1, 1993
for the risk-based standards. As the standards are designed, savings and loans must meet the minimum capital criteria in each
of the three tiers.
These standards are monitored by the OTS as savings and
loans file the required quarterly financial statements. Effective
January 1, 1994, these statements must be stated on a GAAP
basis [Bush and Morrall, 1989, p. 30]. In addition to this return
to GAAP accounting, the independent auditor now has a greater
role in assessing institutional safety and soundness in the following ways. 26 First, institutions with over $150 million in assets
are required to obtain annual audits. Second, in addition to
traditional GAAP and GAAS (generally accepted auditing stan25

For example, Goodwill is generally given a 200% risk weight, thereby requiring a 12% reserve. Mortgage backed securities are given a 20% risk weight,
thereby requiring a 3 % reserve. Cash and federal government backed securities
have a 0% weight, thus requiring no reserves.
26
These provisions are summarized in Journal of Accountancy, March, 1992,
p. 17.
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dards) responsibilities, the audit report must comply with any
additional disclosures that regulations require. For example, a
separate report must be prepared attesting to management assertions that the institution is in compliance with regulations
related to safety and soundness. Third, outside auditors must
agree to provide workpapers to regulators upon request, and
must notify the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
if the auditor's services terminate. Finally, the FDIC may require
that an institution's quarterly financial statements be subject to
CPA review procedures. This authority of the FDIC stems from
its new responsibility as the insuring agency for savings and loans.
In a massive reorganization of the insurance system, FSLIC
merged into the FDIC, the insuring agency for commercial
banks. This facilitated coordination of insurance goals, rates,
and supervision philosophy between the thrift and banking industries. By shifting the insuring of savings and loans and by
the creation of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Congress implemented a policy of regulatory equality for savings and loans and
commercial banks.
As the recent restructuring of savings and loans suggests,
the banking industry has been successful in its long time urging
of parity between the banking and thrift industries. Since 1951,
the Commercial banking industry lobbied for tax equality between banks and savings institutions. 27 These arguments were
reiterated in hearings related to changes implemented in the
percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. Bankers perceived these 1986 changes to be
a move towards tax equality. In addition, arguments in the tax
hearings acknowledged that the deregulation Acts of 1980 and
1982 (DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain) were perceived by both
industries to be regulatory moves towards establishing investm e n t equalities. Thus, a trend had developed towards increasing
equality between banks and savings and loans. The regulatory
equalities implemented in CEBA, FIRREA, and FDICIA could be
viewed as the culmination of this equality movement, with one
27

Banks perceived the percentage of taxable income bad debt deduction to
be the single greatest advantage afforded by the tax law to savings and loans
over commercial banks. In virtually every major tax hearing that opened discussion of this deduction (see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, 1951, 1961, 1969, and 1986 and U.S. Congress, Senate, 1983), the banking industry lobbied for its elimination in order to allow more equitable competition between the two industries.
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major exception which now subjects savings and loans to investm e n t restrictions not required of banks.
The recent legislation implemented a new qualified thrift
lender (QTL) test which restricts savings and loans to investing
70% of their portfolio assets in qualified assets. The definition
of qualified assets is limited to mortgages and home equity
loans, mortgage backed securities, and construction loans. Up
to 15% of these qualified assets can include: investments in service corporations; loans to churches, schools, nursing homes
and hospitals; and consumer and education loans (limited to 5%
of portfolio assets) [Savings Institutions, 1989, p. 33]. Portfolio
assets are defined as total tangible assets reduced by fixed assets
and liquid assets. These definitions impose limitations on the
investment freedom of savings and loans which are even more
severe than the pre-1980 limitations. These restrictions have
been criticized by the industry as being almost vindictive [Wilson, 1990, p. 22].
This QTL test constituted a very significant change in the
three most recent laws which is contrary to the trend towards
equality among competing financial institutions. It serves to
force savings and loans to specialize in mortgages by restricting
other investment activity. At the same time, FHLB membership
was opened up to banks and credit unions; and commercial
banks obtained the authority to acquire savings institutions.
These latter regulatory changes further expanded the operating
capabilities of banks and credit unions by giving them greater
access to housing funds. These financial intermediaries can now
compete with savings and loans for mortgages, and obtain optimally diversified portfolios. However, savings and loans are now
statutorily prohibited from diversifying extensively. This situation may lead to a devaluation in the savings and loan charter in
the future.
WHAT WILL THE 1990s BRING?
This devaluation has been predicted by some experts
[McLean, 1991; Jacobe, 1990; Savings Institutions, 1990]. They
argue that as a result of the 1980s debacle, savings and loans
have a bad image problem to overcome. A viable way of overcoming this problem may be simply to change over from a savings and loan charter to a savings bank or commercial bank
charter. Such a trend has already been observed in California
savings and loans [Savings Institutions, 1990, p. 31] and instituPublished by eGrove, 1993
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tions formed after 1988 [Savings Institutions, 1990, p. 5]. This
leads some commentators to predict the demise of the traditional savings and loan institution.
The function of the traditional savings and loan, making
mortgage loans and holding them to maturity, is perhaps outdated. This conclusion rests primarily on the burgeoning secondary mortgage market which was developed and promoted by
government sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae. This
agency (and others like it) buys mortgages and repackages them
into mortgage backed securities which are sold on the open
market with varying maturities. Such securities are popular
with investors because of a perceived federal guarantee. This
has created an adequate supply of capital to the housing market
despite the savings and loan crisis (see comments by Alfred A.
Dellibova, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in Mortgage Banking, 1991, p. 31). It has also served to integrate housing financing into the nation's overall capital market.
This development of the real estate loan marketplace may
eventually usurp the traditional function of the savings and loan
industry. However, some industry observers still see the need
for a strong consumer-oriented banking industry which would
include mortgage financing and some other types of consumer
financing. In addition, as the economy improves and investors
seek investment opportunities with higher returns, they may retreat from the mortgage backed security market. The savings
and loan industry then may acquire a new function in the capital market, that of buying and holding to maturity mortgage
backed securities.
A type of specialization strategy similar to this has been
observed by some empiricists [Kaplan, 1988; Rudolph, 1988].
However, its effect on profitability has not been demonstrated
consistently. Ultimately, carving out a market niche of some
kind may be the key to continued viability of savings and loans,
as well as other financial intermediaries. Thus, all financial intermediaries could focus on their managerial strengths in structuring a strategy anywhere from specializing in housing finance,
to consumer lending, to becoming a completely "diversified financial supermarket" [McLean, 1991]. Such specialization decisions would then rest with management instead of Congress,
and the industry as a whole could be more responsive to market
changes. This flexibility could be effected by regulatory changes
allowing a universal charter for financial intermediaries. This
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss1/2
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development, with corresponding adjustments in the tax law,
would be an appropriate culmination to the 1980s piecemeal
trend toward equality. It would also assist Congress in synchronizing its goals for the financial services industry.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress has made major progress in the
1980s in equalizing the regulatory structure of the financial services industry. The savings and loan industry benefited from
these changes by becoming better able to respond to changing
market conditions. Many of these changes were, however, overdue corrections of poor legislation in the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s. Those regulations (specifically the imposition of Regulation Q, tax and regulatory portfolio restrictions, and overly generous loan-to-value ratios and mortgage terms) set the stage for
the crisis the industry encountered in the late 1970s. The
disintermediation crisis of the 1970s led to a severe net worth
problem from which the industry was not given the opportunity
to recover until DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This net worth problem was a driving force in
many of the irregularities that developed in the industry during
the 1980s. Better timing and coordination of the diversification
opportunities afforded by DIDMCA, Garn-St. Germain and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, combined with the FIRREA structural
changes have reduced these irregularities. Attention to these
past policy changes, however, is only useful in understanding
the problems of today and for examining needed future policy
changes.
In planning for the future, Congress must recognize that
market conditions have integrated the housing finance function
into the overall capital market structure. Therefore, designing a
future for the savings and loan industry must involve a process
of setting policy goals for the entire financial services industry.
Legislation in the 1980s moved in the direction of equalizing
opportunities for the thrift and banking sectors of the financial
services industry. However, it stopped short of full equalization
and a definitive policy statement. Once an integrated policy goal
is established, legislators can then structure tax considerations,
supervisory functions and other regulations to achieve these
goals, while at the same time allowing the institutions the flexibility to respond to ever changing market conditions.
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